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ABSTRACT
The increasing demand for on-device deep learning services calls for
a highly efficient manner to deploy deep neural networks (DNNs)
on mobile devices with limited capacity. The cloud-based solution
is a promising approach to enabling deep learning applications on
mobile devices where the large portions of a DNN are offloaded to
the cloud. However, revealing data to the cloud leads to potential
privacy risk. To benefit from the cloud data center without the
privacy risk, we design, evaluate, and implement a cloud-based
framework Arden which partitions the DNN across mobile devices
and cloud data centers. A simple data transformation is performed
on the mobile device, while the resource-hungry training and the
complex inference rely on the cloud data center. To protect the
sensitive information, a lightweight privacy-preserving mechanism
consisting of arbitrary data nullification and random noise addition
is introduced, which provides strong privacy guarantee. A rigorous
privacy budget analysis is given. Nonetheless, the private pertur-
bation to the original data inevitably has a negative impact on the
performance of further inference on the cloud side. To mitigate
this influence, we propose a noisy training method to enhance the
cloud-side network robustness to perturbed data. Through the so-
phisticated design, Arden can not only preserve privacy but also
improve the inference performance. To validate the proposed Ar-
den, a series of experiments based on three image datasets and a
real mobile application are conducted. The experimental results
demonstrate the effectiveness of Arden. Finally, we implement
Arden on a demo system to verify its practicality.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen impressive successes of deep neural net-
works in various domains. DNNs demonstrate superb capabilities in
discovering high-dimensional structures from large volume of data.
Meanwhile, mobile devices such as smartphones, medical tools, and
Internet of Things (IoT) devices have become nearly ubiquitous.
There is a high demand for the on-device machine learning services,
including object recognition, language translation, health monitor-
ing, and many others [6, 15, 28, 41]. Encouraged by the outstanding
performance of DNNs in these services, people naturally attempt
to push deep learning to mobile devices [23].
The unprecedented advances of deep learning are enabled, in
part, by the ability of very large deep neural networks. For example,
in the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC)
from 2010 to 2015, the continuously decreasing error rates achieved
by the state-of-the-art DNNs are accompanied by their increasing
complexity as shown in Fig. 1. There are millions to hundreds of
millions of parameters in these advanced DNNs which require sig-
nificant processing and storage resource. However, the miniature
nature of mobile devices imposes the intrinsic capacity bottleneck
that makes resource-hungry applications remain off bounds. Partic-
ularly, the large DNN models exceed the limited on-chip memory
of mobile devices, and thus they have to be accommodated by the
off-chip memory, which consumes significantly more energy [7, 14].
What is worse, the enormous dot products aggravate the burden of
processing units. Running a deep learning application can easily
dominate the whole system energy consumption and drain a mobile
device’s battery. Up to now, it is still difficult to deploy powerful
deep learning applications on mobile systems [27].
In order to enable on-device deep learning applications, academia
and industry put forward two solutions: (1) compressing large
DNNs, and (2) partitioning large DNNs across mobile devices and
cloud data centers. The former one tries to prune and accelerate
DNNs to fit deep learning applications into mobile devices. But this
complicated technique suffers from performance degradation [7]
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Figure 1: The performance and size of the DNNs in
ILSVRC’10-15 [16, 21, 40, 42].
and uncontrolled energy consumption [45]. For the latter solution,
the shallow portions of a DNN are deployed onmobile devices while
the complex and large parts are offloaded to the cloud data center.
A fast transformation is first carried out on the input data locally.
Then, the transformed data are revealed to the cloud data center
for the time and energy consuming inferences. The experiment in
[24] shows that the total energy consumption can be reduced by
approximately 10% when a larger proportion of the DNN inferences
are conducted in the cloud. Apart from the resource and energy
consideration, the cloud-based solution is appealing for deep learn-
ing service providers. Because of the intellectual property, the deep
learning service providers are not always willing to share their
valuable and highly tuned DNNs [35]. Deploying large parts of a
DNN in the centralized data center provides a viable alternative to
protect the service providers’ intellectual property. The cloud-based
solution paves a promising way to enable deep learning applications
on mobile devices.
Despite the benefits brought by the cloud-based solution, it
presents obvious privacy issues with transmitting data from mobile
devices to the cloud data centers. Once an individual reveals its data
to cloud data centers for further inferences, it is almost impossible
for the individual to control the usage of the data. Hence, it is a
critical requirement to lessen the privacy risk when implementing
the cloud-based deep learning applications. Unfortunately, this is a
challenging and tough problem for a number of reasons:
• Guarantee the privacy. Although the existing literature claimed
that revealing the transformed data rather than the raw data
could provide a satisfactory privacy protection [29, 43], there
still exist the threats of information disclosure [26]. Therefore,
a privacy-preserving mechanism that provides a rigorous and
strong privacy guarantee should be designed.
• Minimize the overhead. It is to relieve the burden of mobile
devices that we resort to the cloud-based solutions. It contradicts
the original purpose to cause too much overhead when providing
privacy protection. Hence, we should minimize the overhead
of the privacy-preserving mechanism to provide lightweight
property.
• Improve the performance. In order to preserve privacy, the
data released to the cloud data center is distorted and perturbed,
which definitely would lead to a degradation of the inference
performance, e.g., classification accuracy. An effective method is
needed to alleviate degradation and yield a good inference result
while still preserving privacy.
To address the above problems, we take both privacy and perfor-
mance into consideration, and propose a privAte infeRence frame-
work based on Deep nEural Networks in mobile cloud, named
Arden. Arden partitions a deep neural network across the mobile
device and the cloud data center. On the mobile device side1, the
raw data is transformed by the shallow portions of the DNN to
extract their lower-level features. The local neural networks are
derived from the pretrained neural networks to avoid local training,
and can be regarded as a feature extractor for different inference
tasks based on the idea of transfer learning [44]. In order to pre-
serve privacy, we introduce the differential privacy mechanism [10]
on the local side, which adds deliberate noise into the data before
uploading. The large portions of the DNN are deployed in the cloud
data center to run the complex and resource-hungry inference tasks.
We propose a noisy training method to make the DNN robust to
the additional noise in the data revealed by mobile devices, and so
to improve the inference performance. Our main contributions are
listed as follows:
• A framework enabling deep learning on mobile devices.
We take the privacy, performance, and overhead into consider-
ation, and design a framework to partition the very large deep
neural networks in mobile cloud environment. All the resource-
hungry tasks, e.g., network training and complex inference are
offloaded to the cloud data centers. The works in the cloud data
center are transparent to end mobile devices, which enables the
online model upgrade.
• A differentially private local transformation mechanism.
To preserve privacy, we propose a new mechanism to perturb
the local data transformation based on the differential privacy
mechanism. Compared with the existing ones, our proposed
mechanism can be customized to protect specific data items,
and fits well with the stacking structure of neural networks. The
corresponding privacy budget is analyzed theoretically to provide
rigorous privacy guarantee.
• A noisy training approach for performance improvement.
We propose a noisy training approach that contains a generative
model to inject delicate noisy samples into the training set to
increase the robustness of cloud-side DNNs to the perturbed data.
By this method, the negative effect incurred by the end-side noise
on the inference tasks is largely alleviated.
• Thorough empirical evaluation. We evaluate the proposed
framework on standard image classification tasks and a real mo-
bile application. Further, Arden is deployed on a real demo sys-
tem to test its overhead.
2 PRELIMINARY
In this section, we briefly introduce the basic knowledge of deep
learning, including deep neural networks, stochastic gradient de-
scent algorithm, and transfer learning. Then, we revisit the defini-
tion of differential privacy.
1Notice that the terms mobile device side, local side, and end side are used interchange-
ably in this paper.
2.1 Deep Learning
Deep learning, which revolutionizes many machine learning tasks,
transforms inputs to desired outputs by feed-forward neural net-
works comprising many layers of basic units like affine transfor-
mations and nonlinear activation functions. The essential idea of
stacking multiple layers is to extract complex representations from
high-dimensional inputs progressively. A typical neural network
with two hidden layers is shown in Fig. 2(a). Each node in the net-
work is a neuron that takes a weighted sum of the outputs of the
prior layer, and then expose the sum to the next layer through a
nonlinear activation function.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Illustrations of deep neural networks and trans-
fer learning. The green and the orange arrows represent the
feed-forward and the back-propagation procedures, respec-
tively.
The main work of training a DNN is to automatically learn the
parameters that minimize the loss function of the DNN from large
volume of training data. It is usually done by the mini-batch sto-
chastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm and its variants [17, 47].
At each step, the SGD first calculates the loss function through the
feed-forward procedure. Given the batch of random training sam-
ples xN = {x1, ...,x |N |} and the parameters ω, the feed-forward
procedure computes the output of the DNN sequentially, and then
calculates the loss for each training sample J (ω;xi ) that depicts the
difference between the feedforward output and the ground truth.
After that, the backpropagation procedure calculates the partial de-
rivative of J (ω;xi )with respect to each parameterωj inω, and then
takes an average value over the batch, i.e., дj = 1|N |
∑
i ∇ωj J (ω;xi ).
The update rule for ωj is:
ωj = ωj − αдj , (1)
where α is the learning rate. One full iteration over all training
samples is referred as an epoch.
As the stacking layers represent input data at a progressively
higher level of abstraction, the shallow-layer representations appear
to be general to diverse datasets or tasks, rather than specific to a
particular one [44]. It is plausible to regard the shallow layers of a
pretrained DNN on one dataset as a generic feature extractor that
can be applied to other target tasks or datasets. This is the key idea
of transfer learning in deep neural networks. More precisely, the
usual transfer learning approach [34, 44] is to copy the first n layers
of a pretrained DNN to the first n layers of a target DNN. Then, the
remaining layers of the target DNN are retrained towards the task
or dataset of interest while the transferred shallow layers are left
frozen. One illustration of the transfer learning approach is shown
in Fig. 2(b).
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a concept of privacy tailored to the privacy-
preserving data analysis. It aims at providing provable privacy
guarantee for sensitive data and is increasingly regarded as a stan-
dard notion for rigorous privacy [5]. Formally, the definition of
ε-differential privacy is given as below:
Definition 2.1. [9] A randomizedmechanismA is ε-differentially
private, iff for any adjacent input d and d ′, and any output S of A,
Pr[A(d) = S] ≤ eε · Pr[A(d ′) = S]. (2)
Typically, the inputs d and d ′ are adjacent inputs when they
differ by only one data item. The adjacent input is an application-
specific notion. For example, a sentence is divided into several items
for every 5 words. Two sentences are considered to be adjacent sen-
tences if they differ by at most 5 consecutive words. The parameter
ε is the privacy budget [9], which controls the privacy guarantee
of the randomized mechanism A. A smaller value of ε indicates a
stronger privacy guarantee. According to this definition, a differ-
entially private algorithm can provide aggregate representations
about a set of data items without leaking information of any data
item.
A general method for approximating a deterministic function f
with ε-differential privacy is to add noise calibrated to the global
sensitivity of f , denoted as ∆f , which is the maximal value of
∥ f (d) − f (d ′)∥ among any pair of d and d ′. For instance, the Lapla-
cian mechanism is defined by,
Af (d) = f (d) + Lap(
∆f
ε
), (3)
where Lap(∆fε ) is a random variable sampled from the Laplace
distribution with scale ∆fε .
The differential privacy enjoys a superb property, the immunity
to post-processing [11]. Any algorithm cannot compromise the
differentially private output and make it less differentially private.
That is, if a differential privacy mechanism protects the privacy of
sensitive data item, then the privacy loss cannot be increased even
by the most sophisticated algorithm.
3 THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
This section describes the proposed framework toward DNN-based
private inference in mobile cloud. We first give the overview of
Arden. Then, the two key techniques in Arden are detailed.
3.1 Overview
The overview of Arden is presented in Fig. 3. Arden relies on the
mobile cloud environment and divides the DNN into the local-side
part and the cloud-side part. The local neural network is derived
from the pretrained DNN whose structure and weights are frozen.
The cloud neural network is fine-tuned in the training phase. The
Figure 3: The overview of Arden.
whole training phase and the complex inference phase are per-
formed in the cloud data centers. Mobile devices merely undertake
the simple and lightweight feature extraction and perturbation.
In the inference phase, the sensitive data is transformed by the
local neural network to extract the general features embedded in
it. For preserving privacy, the transformation is perturbed by both
nullification and random noise which are consistent with differen-
tial privacy. Then, the perturbed representations are transmitted
to the cloud for further complex inference. Because the data to be
transmitted are the abstract representation of the raw data, the size
of the data to be transmitted is smaller than that of the raw data.
The local initial transformation can reduce communication cost
compared with transmitting raw data directly.
In the training phase, we use the public data of the same type
as the sensitive data to train the cloud neural network. In order to
improve the robustness of the cloud neural network to the noise,
we propose a noisy training method where both raw training data
and generative training data are fed into the network to tune the
weights. The key component in noisy training is the generative
model that generates sophisticated noisy training samples based
on the public data. In addition, it is worth noting that the training
phase and the inference phase can run in parallel once we get an
initial cloud neural network. Benefitting from the transfer learning,
we only need to train the cloud neural network for different datasets
and tasks while keeping the local neural network frozen. It indicates
that all the works on the cloud side are transparent to end mobile
devices. The cloud neural network can be upgraded online without
the service interruption to end users. This transparency property
facilitates the deep learning service on one hand and on the other
hand protects the intellectual property of service providers.
3.2 Differentially Private Transformation
To preserve privacy, the data transformation on the local side is
perturbed. One of the key techniques in Arden is how to inject the
perturbation that satisfies the differential privacy and measure the
privacy budget of the perturbation.
Regarding the local neural network as a deterministic function
xr = M(xs ), where xs represents sensitive input data, one in-
tuitive attempt of providing ε-differential privacy is to add noise
that conforms to the Laplace distribution with scale ∆M/ε into
the output xr . However, it is difficult to estimate the global sen-
sitivity. An overly conservative estimation would add too much
Algorithm 1: Differentially Private Transformation
Input: Each sensitive data x s ; Local network M(·) = Ml (Ml (·)).
Parameter :Nullification matrix In ; Noise scale σ ; Bound threshold
B; Injection layer l .
1 x ′s ← x s ⊙ In ;
2 x l ← Ml (x ′s );
3 x ′l ← x l /max(1,
∥x l ∥∞
B );
4 x˜ ′l ← x ′l + Lap(B/σ I);
5 x˜ r ← Ml (x˜ ′l );
Output: Perturbed representation x˜ r .
noise into the output representation, which destroys the utility
of the representation for future inferences. Besides, this straight-
forward approach cannot be customized to provide personalized
private requirements such as masking particular data items that
are highly sensitive. Therefore, we propose a more sophisticated
mechanism including nullification and layer-wise perturbation. The
corresponding privacy budget analysis is given in detail.
Algorithm 1 outlines the differentially private data transforma-
tion on the local side. For each sensitive data xs , some data items
are masked by the nullification operation. Then the data is fed into
the local neural network for feature extraction. At a specific layer
l , for the output ofMl (the neural network from the first layer to
the l-th layer), we bound its infinity norm by B, and inject noise
to protect privacy. At last, the perturbed final representation is
generated byMl (the neural network after the l-th layer), and is
transmitted to the cloud side. Next we discuss each operation in
Algorithm 1 in detail and analyze the privacy budget.
Nullification: Given the input sensitive data xs that consists of
N data items, nullification performs item-wise multiplication of xs
with In , where In is a binary matrix constituted of 0 and 1 with
the same dimensions as xs . In can be either specified by end users
to nullify the highly sensitive data items or generated randomly.
The number of zeros in In is determined by ⌈N · µ⌉, where ⌈·⌉ is
the ceiling function, and µ is the nullification rate. The zeros are
located in In conforming to the uniform distribution. Apparently, a
high value of µ has a negative impact on the inference performance,
which will be examined in Section 4.
Norm bounding: It is difficult to estimate the global sensitivity of
neural networks. Hence, for each sensitive data xs , we clip the max
value of the output of the injection layer within fixed bounds to esti-
mate sensitivity, i.e., the output x l is bounded as x l /max(1, ∥x l ∥∞B ).
It indicates that x l is preserved when ∥x l ∥∞ ≤ B, whereas it is
scaled down to B when ∥x l ∥∞ > B. Then, the global sensitivity can
be estimated as 2B. The bound threshold B is input-independent
and so would leak no sensitive information. In practice, the value
of B can be set as the median of the infinity norm of the original
outputs over the training [1].
We add random noise sampled from the Laplace distribution into
the bounded output x ′l to protect the privacy. Different from the
existing works where the noise is added into the final output of the
deterministic function, the noise is added during the transforma-
tion in Algorithm 1. This injection method is more flexible, and fits
much better with the stacking structure of neural networks. One
important issue of differentially private transformation is determin-
ing the privacy budget that represents a rigorous privacy guarantee
provided by the designed mechanism. It is given as follows.
Theorem 3.1. Given the sensitive data xs and the local neural
networkM, Algorithm 1 is ε-differentially private,
ε = ln[(1 − µ)e2σ /Λ + µ], (4)
where Λ = ∥∇x ′lMl ∥∞.
See Appendix A for the proof.
We can find that the Laplacian mechanism is a special case of
Theorem 3.1. If we do not perform the nullification, and directly
add noise into the final output of the local neural network, then
µ = 0,Ml (x) = x , and so ∇x ′lMl = 1. As a result, ε = 2σ , which
agrees with the Laplacian mechanism.
3.3 Noisy Training
The differentially private transformation on the mobile side pro-
vides a guaranteed privacy for sensitive data, but perturbing the
local transformation incurs the performance sacrifice in the cloud-
side inferences nonetheless. The cloud-side DNN trained by the
conventional training method where the loss of the DNN is min-
imized on the purely clean training data lacks the robustness to
the noisy representations revealed by mobile devices. In order to
mitigate the negative effectiveness caused by the perturbation, we
propose the noisy training method, another key technique in Ar-
den, to enhance the robustness of cloud-side DNNs.
One explanation of the DNN’s lack of robustness is that noisy
representations are the blind points of the DNN trained by the
conventional method. The robustness of cloud-side DNN could be
enhanced by training on a mixture of noisy and clean representa-
tions. The new training loss is defined as:
J (ω;xr , x˜r ) = λJ (ω;xr ) + (1 − λ)J (ω; x˜r ),
x˜r = xr + Lap(B/σ I). (5)
Instead of calculating training loss merely on the clean repre-
sentations, (5) combines the losses on both the clean and the noisy
representations, and uses λ to control the tradeoff between the
two losses. Then, the robustness of the cloud-side DNN to noisy
representations could be improved.
However, the way in which the random noise is added during
the inference is unknown to anyone except for the mobile device
itself. In addition, due to the nature of randomness, it is obviously
impractical to train the cloud-side DNN on all possible noisy rep-
resentations. A deviation from the trained noisy representations
could still be the blind point of the cloud-side DNN. To overcome
this problem and further enhance the robustness, we train the
cloud-side DNN under the worst situation, which can be viewed
as a min-max problem. We inject the worst perturbation r into the
generated noisy representations to maximize the DNN’s deviation
from the original output, i.e., the maximal loss J (ω; x˜r + r ), while
the DNN tries to minimize the deviation through training:
min max
r ; | |r | |2≤η
J (ω; x˜r + r ), (6)
where r is the perturbation added to the trained noisy representa-
tions, and η controls the scale of the noise.
Algorithm 2: Noisy Training in Each Batch
Input: Clean representation x r ; Cloud-side DNN C(ω).
Parameter :Batch size N ; Noise scale σ ; Bound threshold B;
Controllers λ and η; Learning rate α .
1 d ← 0;
2 foreach x (i )r in {x (1)r , ..., x (N )r } do
3 L1 ← Loss(y (i )true ; C(ω ;x (i )r ));
4 x˜ (i )r ← x r + Lap(B/σ I);
5 L2 ← Loss(y (i )true ; C(ω ; x˜ (i )r );
6 д ← ∇
x˜
(i )
r
L2;
7 r ← η д∥д∥2 ;
8 L3 ← Loss(y (i )true ; C(ω ; x˜ (i )r + r );
9 L ← λL1 + (1 − λ)(L2 + L3);
10 d ← d + ∇ωL;
11 ω ← ω − α dN ;
During the noisy training, we determine the worst perturbation
that maximizes the deviation, and train the cloud-side DNN to be
robust to such perturbation through (6). Generally, it is difficult to
obtain a closed form for the exact r that maximizes J (ω; x˜r + r ),
especially for complex models such as the DNN. To tackle this prob-
lem, we use the first-order Taylor series to approximate J (ω; x˜r +r ):
J (ω; x˜r + r ) ≈ J (ω; x˜r ) + ∇x˜ r J (ω; x˜r )r . (7)
The perturbation to the noisy representation causes the deviation
to grow by ∇x˜ r J (ω; x˜r )r . We can maximize this increase subject
to the L2-norm constraint on r by assigning the perturbation in the
gradient direction of J (ω; x˜r ) with respect to x˜r :
r = η
д
| |д | |2 ,
д = ∇x˜ r J (ω; x˜r ).
(8)
The gradient д can be efficiently computed by the backpropaga-
tion [38]. Then, the training loss is defined as:
J (ω;xr , x˜r ) = λJ (ω;xr ) + (1 − λ)[J (ω; x˜r ) + J (ω; x˜r + r )]. (9)
Algorithm 2 outlines the noisy training framework for the cloud-
side DNN. It is designed based on the stochastic gradient descent
algorithm. Different from the conventional SGD, the noisy training
jointly minimizes the loss on clean representations L1, the loss
on noisy representations L2, and the loss on perturbed noisy rep-
resentations L3. In each batch, Algorithm 2 firstly computes the
loss on clean representations. Then, the noisy representations are
generated, and are fed into the cloud-side DNN to get the loss on
noisy representations. In order to augment the robustness to the
random noisy representations, Algorithm 2 computes the gradient
of L2 with respect to the noisy representations and generates the
worst perturbation to the noisy representations. Finally, the back-
propagation calculates the partial derivative of the joint loss with
respect to each parameter inω. The parametersω are updated by
an average value over the batch.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, image classification tasks and a real mobile applica-
tion are used as experimental examples to evaluate the effectiveness
of Arden. We first examine the effect of different parameters based
on two image benchmark datasets, MNIST [25] and SVHN [32],
and then verify the performance improvement based on CIFAR-10
[20] and the preceding two datasets. In addition, in order to verify
the effectiveness in a real scenario, we use a mobile application2
DeepMood [6] to test Arden’s performance and analyze the perfor-
mance under different privacy budgets. DeepMood harnesses the
sequential information collected from the basic keystroke patterns
and the accelerometer on the phone (e.g., alphanumeric character
typing pattern, special character typing pattern, and accelerometer
values) to predict the user’s mood.
For image classification tasks, three widely used convolutional
deep neural networks (Conv-Small, Conv-Middle, and Conv-Large)
are implemented in Arden [22, 36]. We derive the local neural net-
work from Conv-Small, which is pretrained on CIFAR-100 dataset
[20]. The first 3 layers of the pretrained Conv-Small are deployed
as the local neural network. For MNIST and SVHN, we use Conv-
Middle as the cloud-side DNN. In the performance comparison,
Conv-Large is used for CIFAR-10. For different datasets and cloud-
side DNNs, the local neural network remains unchanged to show
the transfer learning ability and the transparency property.
For DeepMood, the single-view DNN proposed in [6] is used
as the cloud-side DNN. We add an extra dense layer as the local
network which is pretrained on special character typing pattern.
Alphanumeric character typing pattern (ALPH.) and accelerometer
values (ACCEL.) are used to test Arden’s performance.
The proposed models are implemented using TensorFlow [2]. For
image classification tasks, the learning rate and batch size are set
as 0.0015 and 128, respectively. The numbers of epochs for MNIST,
SVHN, and CIFAR-10 are 35, 45, and 70, respectively. For DeepMood,
the learning rate, the batch size, and the epochs are 0.001, 256, and
100, respectively. Considering the randomness during perturbation,
we run the test experiments ten times independently to obtain an
averaged value. The code is provided for reproducibility.
We suppose that the deep learning service provider and the mo-
bile device users reach a consensus over the perturbation strength
in advance, which is a common practice in reality. The perturbation
strength is represented by (b, µ), where b is the diversity of the
Laplace distribution, and µ is the nullification rate. In this section,
the perturbation strengths for MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, and Deep-
Mood (including ALPH. and ACCEL.) are set as (5, 10%), (2, 5%), (2,
5%), and (0.5, 10%), respectively. When the perturbation is injected
to the last layer of local network, based on Theorem 3.1, the privacy
budgets for MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, ALPH., and ACCEL. are 0.7,
3.7, 3.5, 7.8, and 9.8, respectively.
4.1 Parameter Selection
The parameters λ and η are two important parameters in the pro-
posed noisy training. Fig. 4 shows the change of the performance
with varying λ and η. Due to space limitation, here we focus on
MNIST and SVHN. It can be found that when η is too small, it has
limited ability to resist the randomness of perturbation. However,
when η is too large, the loss L3 would overwhelm the other losses,
which makes the DNN focus more on resisting randomness rather
than classifying samples correctly. Because a small value of λmeans
2http://www.biaffect.com
(a) MNIST (5,10%) (b) SVHN (2,5%)
Figure 4: Effect of η and λ.
(a) Effect of b on MNIST (b) Effect of µ on MNIST
(c) Effect of b on SVHN (d) Effect of µ on SVHN
Figure 5: Effect of b and µ when the model has been trained
with the pre-assigned perturbation which is represented by
the brown dash line.
a large weight of L3 in the joint loss, small λ usually aggravates
this phenomenon. Based on the results in Fig. 4, η is set as 5 for the
following experiments. The effect of λ will be further discussed.
4.2 Impact of Private Perturbation
Although it is assumed that there is a prior consensus between
the mobile device users and the deep learning service provider,
mobile device users may change their perturbation strength. Hence,
we investigate the impact of different perturbation strength on
the performance when the model has been trained with a pre-
assigned perturbation strength. It can be seen from Fig. 5 that
the accuracy usually reaches the peak around the pre-assigned
perturbation strength. An interesting observation is that when
the perturbation strength is 0, i.e., b = 0, µ = 0, the accuracy is
unexpectedly low, especially for λ = 0.2, 0.5. This is because a
small value of λ makes the DNN biased to the noisy samples, which
weakens the DNN’s ability to classify the purely clean samples.
When the perturbation strength is too large, it exceeds the resistance
ability given by the noisy training, so the accuracy decreases. Owing
to the noisy training, the performance changes are within 10% in
most cases.
Table 1: Accuracy in Layer-Wise Perturbation (%)
Input Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3
MNIST 97.67 97.24 97.57 98.02
SVHN 88.56 88.66 87.82 88.12
(a) (1, 1%) (b) (5,10%)
Figure 6: Visualization of noise and reconstruction.
As the proposed perturbation method in Section 3 enables the
layer-wise perturbation, we further study the impact of injecting
perturbation into the different layers of the local neural network.
The results in Table 1 show that the DNN trained by the proposed
noisy training method is robust to the layer-wise perturbation. For
different perturbation, the DNN can keep a relatively high accuracy.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of private perturbation intu-
itively, we visualize noise and reconstruction in Fig. 6. The convo-
lutional denoising autoencoder [31], which has been successfully
applied to image denoising and super-resolution reconstruction
[8, 37], is used to reconstruct the original data from the perturbed
ones. We train the model based on two perturbation strengths.
When the perturbation strength is relatively weak, the perturbed
pictures can to some extent be reconstructed, although the recon-
structed pictures are quite different from the original ones. When
the perturbation strength reaches (5,10%), the strength used in
our experimental settings, the perturbed pictures can hardly be
reconstructed, which indicates that the adversarial attacker cannot
restore the original data based on the revealed perturbed ones even
the perturbation strength is public.
4.3 Performance Comparison
To verify the performance improvement brought by Arden, we
compare it with three variants on three image datasets and two
real-scenario datasets. BASE denotes the cloud-side DNN, i.e., Conv-
Middle for MNIST and SVHN, Conv-Large for CIFAR-10, a sigle-
view DNN for DeepMood. The training data and the testing data are
fed into the network directly without local transformation, which
can be regarded as revealing raw data to the cloud.Arden-L1 means
that only the loss L1 is considered when training the cloud-side
DNN. It is tested in two situations: test without private perturbation
and test with private perturbation. Arden is the complete frame-
work proposed in this paper. λ is set as 0.2 for MNIST, SVHN, and
DeepMood, 0.5 for CIFAR-10.
Table 2 lists the result of every framework. BASE achieves the
highest accuracy with the sacrifice of privacy. Testing Arden-L1
without perturbed data shows slightly lower accuracy than BASE.
Table 2: Accuracy of Different Frameworks (%)
Perturb MNIST SVHN CIFAR-10 ALPH. ACCEL.
BASE NO 98.21 93.24 87.42 85.45 82.36
Arden-L1 NO 97.44 91.18 83.18 84.09 81.44
Arden-L1 YES 50.17 40.93 32.73 60.20 57.19
Arden YES 98.16 90.02 79.52 83.55 80.05
(a) ALPH. (b) ACCEL.
Figure 7: Accuracy vs. privacy budget ϵ .
This result indicates that some useful information is lost during
the local transformation. The accuracy of testing Arden-L1 with
perturbed data drops severely (e.g., 23.89% on ALPH. and 24.25%
on ACCEL.) compared with testing Arden-L1 without perturbed
data. This result indicates that the model trained by the traditional
training method which merely relies on clean data is not applicable
to the prediction with perturbation, and it is hard to maintain
accuracy while protecting user’s privacy. Arden which jointly
minimizes the loss on clean data, noisy data, and perturbed noisy
data, can considerably mitigate the negative impact brought by
the private perturbation. Specially, the performance improvement
demonstrated in the real mobile applications indicates that mobile
device users can benefit from the cloud resources without risking
their privacy in reality.
Notice that we do not make comparison with other advanced
DNNs like DenseNet [19], because we intend to examine the perfor-
mance improvement brought by the noisy training. The cloud-side
DNN can be replaced by any other advanced DNNs to achieve
higher accuracy. Specially, thanks to the transparency property of
Arden, the model can switch seamlessly from one to another.
4.4 Analysis of Privacy Budget
Privacy budget represents the privacy loss in the framework. To
analyze the impact of privacy budgets on performance, we use the
real mobile application DeepMood to test Arden’s performance
when the privacy budget changes. In this work, the privacy budget
is controlled by two parameters, i.e, b and µ. Here, we fix the value
of µ as 10%, and change the privacy budget ϵ by adjusting b from
0.3 to 5.
Fig. 7 shows that Arden can maintain the accuracy at a high
value for a wide range of privacy budgets. When ϵ < 1, the accuracy
decreases by 14% and 12% for ALPH. and ACCEL., respectively. The
accuracy almost keeps unchanged until ϵ decreases to 1.9 for ALPH.
and 2.4 for ACCEL., respectively, which is a quite tight privacy
requirement [33]. These results argue that Arden is applicable
Figure 8: CPU status during local transformation.
to different privacy requirements. It can effectively improve the
performance even when the privacy budget is relatively tight. In
addition, we plot the accuracy of Arden-L1 when it is tested with
private perturbation. The gap between the two lines can be viewed
as the accuracy improvement brought by the noisy training. We
find that the gap is large when ϵ is small and narrows with the
increase of ϵ in both datasets.
4.5 Implementation on Android
We implement the Arden in a demo system composed by HUAWEI
HONOR 8 and DELL INSPIRON 15. The mobile device is equipped
with ARM Cortex-A53@2.3GHz and ARM Cortex-A53@1.81GHz.
The laptop is equippedwith Core i7-7700HQ@2.80GHz andNVIDIA
GTX 1050Ti. The mobile device is connected to the laptop through
the IEEE 802.11 wireless network. We use TensorFlow to generate
the deployable model for the Android system.
Firstly, we investigate the CPU status of the mobile device during
the local transformation. 3,000 SVHN pictures are processed consec-
utively. Fig. 8 shows that the CPU load boosts during the local data
transformation. Especially, the CPU temperature increases by 9
degrees, which is an indicator of high energy cost. This observation
argues that executing a small neural network for a relatively long
time can place a heavy burden on mobile devices. It is not suitable
for most mobile devices to deploy DNNs directly.
We further compare the overhead of the local neural network
with those of other four DNNs. MobileNet [18] is a lightweight
model for mobile vision applications. GoogLeNet [42] is a deep
convolutional neural network that achieved the state of the art in
ILSVRC’14. For the local neural network, the mobile device only
undertakes the local transformation, and then transmits the data to
the laptop, asArden does. The other four DNNs entirely rely on the
mobile device. The networks process 100 SVHN pictures consecu-
tively. Table 3 lists the response time and the resource consumption
of different networks. We estimate the energy consumption based
Table 3: Execution Overhead Comparison
Network Time(ms) Memory(MB) Energy(J)
Local 3267 0.56 1.29
Conv-Middle 7386 5.86 5.07
Conv-Large 12195 12.89 8.37
MobileNet 4106 3.34 2.82
GoogLeNet 36251 53.12 24.87
Note: The time and energy cost contain the part
spent on transmitting data and waiting for the re-
sponse from the laptop.
on the statistics from [3, 4]. The average reductions of Arden com-
pared with the other four DNNs in terms of time, memory, and
energy are 60.10%, 92.07%, and 77.05%, respectively.
5 RELATEDWORK
Deep learning onmobile devices. Lane et al. [24] studied typical
mobile sensing tasks using DNNs. The preliminary results high-
lighted the critical need for further research towards making use of
advances in deep learning to the field of mobile sensing. However,
suffered from the contradiction between the large size of DNNs
and the limited capacity of mobile devices, it is challenging to de-
ploy deep learning applications in mobile devices efficiently. Han et
al. [13] tried to compress the DNN through a three-stage method:
pruning, trained quantization and Huffman coding, which showed
a considerable reduction in terms of the storage requirements of
DNNs. Offloading the heavy computational tasks to the cloud data
center [12, 30] is another solution to enable deep learning applica-
tions on mobile devices. A distributed DNN architecture across the
cloud, the edge, and the mobile devices was designed in [43] which
allowed the combination of fast inference on mobile devices and
complex inference in cloud data centers.
Privacy issue in deep learning. Deep learning naturally re-
quires users’ data to train neural networks and infer results, which
raises the privacy issue for sensitive data. To preserve privacy when
offloading operations to the cloud, Zhang et al. [46] encrypted the
sensitive data by using the BGV encryption scheme. More recently,
Osia et al. [35] designed a hybrid deep learning architecture for
private inference across mobile devices and clouds. The Siamese
network was used to protect against undesired inference attacks,
which in essence provided k-anonymity protection. Li et al. [29]
proposed a flexible framework for private deep learning. Before
uploading data to clouds, it was transformed by the local neural net-
work whose structure, including the number of layers, the depth of
output channels, and the subset of selected channels, was variable.
Differential privacy mechanism which provides provable privacy
guarantee has been used in deep learning. Shokri et al. [39] pre-
sented a privacy-preserving distributed SGD to enable multiple data
owners to collaborate on training a DNN. The sparse vector tech-
nique was introduced in this work to provide differential privacy.
Abadi et al. [1] designed a new differential privacy mechanism in
SGD to reduce the privacy budget. However, these works applied
differential privacy to the training phase rather than the inference
phase. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work using
differential privacy in the inference phase to provide a provable
privacy guarantee.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In order to enable highly efficient deep learning service on mo-
bile devices, we propose Arden which partitions the DNN across
mobile devices and clouds in this paper. All the heavy works are of-
floaded to the cloud, while the mobile device merely undertakes the
simple data transformation and perturbation. To limit the privacy
risk when uploading data to clouds, we introduce the differential
privacy mechanism, and design a new differentially private pertur-
bation that shows more flexibility and fits well with the stacking
structure of neural networks. A rigorous analysis is given to deter-
mine the privacy budget of the perturbation. Apart from privacy,
the inference performance is taken into consideration in this paper.
A novel training method that injects deliberate noisy samples into
the training data is proposed. A series of experiments based on
three image datasets and a real mobile application demonstrate that
Arden can not only preserve users’ privacy but also improve the
inference performance. Finally, we implement Arden on a demo
mobile cloud system to verify its practicality and test its overhead.
Arden effectively reduces the resource consumption by over 60%.
A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
Before proving Theorem 3.1, we first prove the following two theo-
rems.
Theorem A.1. Given a input x and a deterministic function f ,
| f (x)| ≤ B, for ∀a ∈ R+, the random mechanism A(x) = f (x) +
aLap(B/σ ) is ( 2σa )-differentially private.
Proof. For any adjacent inputs x and x ′,
Pr[f (x) + aLap(B/σ ) = S]
Pr[f (x ′) + aLap(B/σ ) = S] =
e−
|S−f (x )|σ
aB
e−
|S−f (x ′)|σ
aB
= e
σ
aB ( |S−f (x ′) |− |S−f (x ) |)
≤ e σaB |f (x )−f (x ′) | ≤ e 2σa
Based on the Definition 2.1, we have ε = 2σa . □
Theorem A.2. Given a input x , suppose A(x) is ε-differentially
private, if we perform item-wise nullification of x with In whose
nullification rate is µ, x ′ = x ⊙ In , then A(x ′) is ε ′-differentially
private,
ε ′ = ln[(1 − µ)eε + µ].
Proof. Suppose there are two adjacent inputs x1 and x2 that
differ by one single item i , say x1 = x2 ∪ i . For arbitrary binary
matrix In , after the nullification x ′1 = x1 ⊙ In , x ′2 = x2 ⊙ In , there
are two possible cases, i.e., i < x ′1 and i ∈ x ′1.
Case 1: i < x ′1. Since x1 and x2 differ only by the item i , x1 ⊙ In
= x2 ⊙ In . Then, we have,
Pr[A(x1 ⊙ In ) = S] = Pr[A(x2 ⊙ In ) = S].
Case 2: i ∈ x ′1. Since x1 and x2 differ only by the item i , x ′1 and
x ′2 remain adjacent inputs that differ by the item i . BecauseA(x) is
ε-differentially private, we have,
Pr[A(x1 ⊙ In ) = S] ≤ eε Pr[A(x2 ⊙ In ) = S].
Combine the two cases together, and use the fact that Pr[i <
x ′1] = µ:
Pr[A(x1 ⊙ In ) = S]
= µ Pr[A(x1 ⊙ In ) = S] + (1 − µ) Pr[A(x1 ⊙ In ) = S]
≤ µ Pr[A(x2 ⊙ In ) = S] + (1 − µ)eε Pr[A(x2 ⊙ In ) = S]
= ((1 − µ)eε + µ) Pr[A(x2 ⊙ In ) = S]
= e ln[(1−µ)eε+µ] Pr[A(x2 ⊙ In ) = S]
Based on the Definition 2.1, we have ε ′ = ln[(1 − µ)eε + µ]. □
Then, we give the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof. To begin with, we analyze the local transformation with-
out the nullification operation. Denote the output-bound neural
networkMl asM ′l , the local transformation A defined by Algo-
rithm 1 can be written as:
A(xs ) =Ml (M ′l (xs ) + Lap(B/σ I))
=Ml (x ′l + Lap(B/σ I)).
(10)
Since Lap(B/σ I) is much smaller than x ′l (otherwise, the utility
of the representation is destroyed), we can approximate (10) by
using the first-order Taylor series:
Ml (x ′l + Lap(B/σ I))
≈ Ml (x ′l ) + (∇x ′lMl )
TLap(B/σ I)
=M(xs ) + (∇x ′lMl )
TLap(B/σ I).
(11)
According to the Theorem A.1, (11) is (2σ/Λ)-differentially pri-
vate, where Λ = ∥∇x ′lMl ∥∞.
Then, considering the nullification operation, the overall local
transformation is A(xs ⊙ In ). Based on the Theorem A.2, we have,
ε = ln[(1 − µ)e2σ /Λ + µ].
□
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